30 Years later: On the problem of the relation between structure and function in the brain from a contemporary viewpoint (1966), Part II by Latash, L.P. et al.
BERNSTEIN'S HERITAGE 
Motor Control, 2000, 4, 125-1 49 
O 2000 Human Kinetics Publishers, lnc. 
30 Years Later: On the Problem of 
the Relation Between Structure and Func- 
tion in the Brain From a Contemporary 
Viewpoint (1966), Part II 
Lev I? Latash, Mark L. Latash, and Onno G. Meuer 
In the first half of the present paper, which appeared in vol. 3, issue 4 issue 
of Motor Control, the authors elaborated on Bernstein's (193511967) idea of the 
ambiguity of the relationship between the central command and the peripheral 
effect. The authors presented maybe the strongest statement so far: It is because 
the means are variant that the results can be invariant. As in Bernstein's 1935 
paper, this was taken as evidence that there is no one-to-one relationship between 
structure and function in the brain. The authors discussed the history of localiza- 
tion theories, pointing out that neither strong localizationism nor strong anti- 
localizationism (as in Lashley's equipotentiality) would help understand the re- 
lation between brain structure and function. In order to understand the nature of 
a "brain center" for a function, the authors argued, one has to understand the con- 
cept of "function" itself. The development of "function7' does not imply that the 
organism learns to (re)act in a stereotyped fashion, but that a control matrix is 
established, with non-single-valued relationships, allowing the organism to 
(re)act differently every time, in accordance with the need and actual situation. 
At the end of the first part of the paper, the authors emphasized the importance 
of a new basic logic of neurophysiology. In that sense, there are certain parallels 
between neurophysiology in the 60s (and also today, the present editors would 
add) and physics around the turn of the century, when Maxwell, Boltzmann, 
Planck, and others, created a completely new framework for theoretical physics. 
Lev P. Latash lives in Chicago, IL. Mark L. Latash (corresponding author) is with 
the Department of Kinesiology, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 
16802. Onno G. Meijer is with the Faculty of Human Movement Sciences, Vrije Univer- 
siteit, Van der Boechorststraat 9, 1081 BT Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
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Beyond Functional Systems35 
To solve the problem of the relationship between brain structure and function, it 
is important to take into account contemporary knowledge of the formation of a 
brain mechanism for function realization (a functional system), of the relations 
of this process to the phenomena that occur at the level of the elements (neurons 
and synapses), and of the notions that can be used to describe the functioning of 
such a brain mechanism. 
It is well-known that the formative process of a functional system was not 
so long ago viewed as a process of establishing relations between the future ele- 
ments of the system in order to allow for the possibility of conducting neural 
impulses along these elements. This is how the importance of "beating the trail" 
("Bahnung") and "closing" was understood. Hence, the idea emerged of an excep- 
tional role played by the processes of cellular excitation, of the creation of con- 
nections between the elements of a functional system, and a similarly crucial role 
of inhibition in the elimination of old connections. 
However, this system of concepts is contradicted by a large number of facts 
from electrophysiological, particularly rnicroelectrode studies of different brain 
reactions. Findings by Jasper, Ricci, and Doane (1962), Bums (1958), Granit 
(1964) and many other investigators have demonstrated that there is always a 
possibility of transferring an impulse from one part of the brain to another, and 
*The chapter was originally published in: Grastschenkov, N.I. (Ed., 1966). Physi- 
ology in clinical practice (pp. 38-71). Moscow: Nauka. It was translated by Mark L. 
Latash and edited for clarity. 
3'At the time of writing this paper, the authors continued to use the notion of "func- 
tional system," as is evident in the text that follows. It is only with hindsight that one can 
recognize that the idea of whole-brain involvement in function (cf, Latash, 1998) renders 
the notion of "functional system" superfluous. Of course, this may have caused some of 
the estrangement from Luria or, for instance, Anokhin. It may also be relevant to note that 
at approximately the same time, Gel'fand and Tsetlin (1966) were elaborating a notion of 
a "structural unit" as a function-specific organization of elements within a multi-element 
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that this possibility is being realized all the time. As pointed out by Morrell (cited 
by Wells, 1963), a response to a conditional stimulus can be seen anywhere in the 
brain where one cares to place a microelectrode. 
It follows that a functional system does not simply emerge to ensure the 
possibility to conduct impulses along different parts of the brain. The main factor 
in the process of organizing a functional system (under the influence of a certain 
set of stimuli and the interaction between these stimuli with the regulating brain 
systems) is the creation of a certain spatio-temporal distribution of excitations 
ensuring that an adequate command is sent by the system to the effectors. 
This view on the formation of a functional system, attaching crucial impor- 
tance to the spatio-temporal distribution of excitations (and inhibitions), is sup- 
ported by numerous findings, particularly from studies of the electrical activity 
of single neurons in the visual cortex in response to moving objects, as per- 
formed recently by Hubel and Wiesel(1962),3'j Lettvin et al. (1959), and many 
others. It has been found that these neurons form vertical columns united by their 
response to the direction of object motion in the visual field. This fact clearly 
demonstrates that excitation of one and the same area of the retina induces cer- 
tain spatio-temporal structures of excitation at the level of the neurons of the cor- 
responding projection area of the brain cortex that depend on which retinal areas 
were excited before and which will be excited after it (i.e., depending on the 
spatio-temporal structure of excitation in the periphery). 
All the aforementioned information about the organization of brain functions 
shows that the particular neuronal makeup of a functional brain system is never 
stable, as was emphasized some time ago by A.A. Ukhtomsky (1950), this being 
the only way to achieve stability of a desired ultimate outcome of a reaction. The 
statistical representation of elementary neural brain processes, reflecting the 
numerous neural elements with their connections as well as the vast number of 
incoming influences, only3' allows for a probabilistic determination of which par- 
ticular neurons participate in a brain functional system. This was demonstrated, 
in particular, in experiments by Werner and Mountcastle (1963), by M. Livanov 
(1965), and others. This factor defines the variability of the spatio-temporal dis- 
tribution of excitations within a brain system which, at the same time, is organ- 
36At first reading, such a specific functional role of single cortical neurons appears 
to run against the general argument of the present paper. Note, however, that this refer- 
ence to the work of Hubel and Wiesel allows the authors to introduce the element of time: 
A clear plasticity of cortical organization is implied because the organization of the cortex 
develops in a specific environment, depends on the specific experience of an individual 
(see Edelman, 1987, pp. 127-133; Held & Hein, 1963; Uttall, 1978, pp. 466-474). 
37Logically, this "only" appears to be an overstatement. Note, however, that recent 
developments suggest that the authors may have been correct (cf. Edelman, 1987; Sporns 
& Edelman, 1998). Of course, this is one of the central issues of the paper (cf. note 7 to 
the first part of the present paper). The authors claim that the brain can only be functional, 
can only have adaptive value, if it makes use of stochastic mechanisms. This not only 
marks a clear break from Gestalt but is revolutionary in and of itself. In 1966, the claim 
was not unique (cf. Bums, 1958; Fessard, 1963, on metastability) but still very unusual, 
reminiscent of developments of immunology at the time. 
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ized in such a way that the output of the system can only be received by a pre- 
defined effector apparatus. Hence, the biological significance of a functional 
system is revealed by processes at the output side. 
These specific factors determine both the exceptional flexibility (plastic- 
ity) of functional brain systems and their reliability due to the existence of func- 
tional backups. Together with the aforementioned data on the spatio-temporal 
distribution of excitations forming the functional system, these factors imply, in 
particular, that attempts at finding some kind of special brain areas that would be 
specific to a process of "closing" neural connections are flawed. 
Besides, the whole previous discussion leads to the conclusion that it would 
be inadequate to describe the whole, active, functional brain system in terms of 
cellular excitation and inhibition, unrelated to the particular structural elements of 
the system. A simple quantitative analysis of the number of excited and inhibited 
elements, even if it were to reveal dominance of one of these two forms of activ- 
ity, also fails to characterize the particular spatio-temporal structure of excitations 
and thus cannot be used for conclusions concerning the abilities, purpose, and 
level of activity of the functional system as a wh01e.'~ Correspondingly, it is true 
that one cannot draw conclusions on the state of the elementary cellular processes 
on the basis of an external39 characterization of a function which only allows for 
conclusions on the activity of the brain system as a whole.40 Anyhow, descriptions 
of activity of a whole functional system in terms of the dynamics of basic neu- 
ronal processes, their mobility, magnitude, etc., appear to be unfounded. 
The State of Sleep 
A convincing example, providing support for the above conclusions, is given by 
the state of sleep, viewed for a long time as a state of inhibition of most neuronal 
brain elements based on indices of external activity of the organism. 
Detailed studies of brain electrical activity in clinical observations 
(Grastchenkov, Latash, & Vein, 1965) and animal experiments (Hess, 1964) have 
revealed the exceptional variety of EEG patterns during sleep, with their specific 
sequences, that cannot be reduced to changes in the number of inhibited neurons. 
An analysis of the so-called paradoxical phase of sleep ("fast sleep") by Jouvet 
(1962) and others have shown that the beginning of this sleep stage may be ac- 
companied by changes in brain activity which look indistinguishable from those 
during alert wakefulness. 
Investigations of the behavior of single neurons during falling asleep have 
revealed particular changes in the structure of their firing patterns (~as~er :  1961; 
38Note that this was suited before the invention of imaging techniques such MRI, 
PET, and so on, which by now have revealed the validity of the argument. 
3This is an important part of the argument. The way in which any externally 
defined function (such as vision) can be divided into components does not map one-to- 
one to any subdivision of the internal mechanisms to realize that function. 
401n 1965, "Synergetics" was on its way, presenting a formal basis for stability at 
the macro-level, notwithstanding changes at the micro-level (cf. Haken, 1983). In the neu- 
rophysiological literature of the 1960s, the term metastability was just emerging (cf. Fes- 
- -sard,1963jr- --- -- 
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Verzeano, 1961) but have not produced any convincing evidence that would sug- 
gest a quantitative dominance of inhibitory over excitatory processes different 
from the ratio that is typical of wakefulness in the same neurons (Jasper, 1961; 
Evarts, 1963). All these findings allow one to conclude that sleep is not a state of 
"spreaded inhibition" of cortical neurons, not a mere cessation of the activity of 
a "wakefulness system," but rather the result of the activity of a special func- 
tional brain system directed at destructing the spatio-temporal pattern of excita- 
tions that is typical of brain activity during wakefulness. This conclusion is cor- 
roborated by demonstrations of a decrease in evoked neuronal activity during 
sleep while the spontaneous activity of the same neurons is increased. 
Finally, a third4' point that we would like to emphasize is that both the cessation 
of activity of a functional system, and its emergence, are always related to 
changes in the spatio-temporal structure of excitations and to elements of a given 
system that are also involved in other functional systems. As a particular exam- 
ple, we mention the possibility of the annihilation of a functional system by the 
activation of an antagonist system (for example, the relations between a system 
of "appetite maintenance" and a system of "satiation," as described by Brobeck 
and others, representing, according to Konorski (1962), a general principle of 
brain activity). The destruction of a functional system may also result from the 
activity of a deactivating brain system including, first of all, the already men- 
tioned system of sleep, as well as some others. 
All this suggests that the description of the activity of a brain system, for 
many reasons cannot rely on notions of cellular neurophysiology. It appears to be 
necessary to elaborate new systems of concepts and analytical tools, an impor- 
tant future task of physiology. 
The Whole Brain Is  Involved 
Earlier, we discussed, in general terms, contemporary understanding of the prob- 
lem of the organization of brain function and some principles of the formation of 
the neuronal ensembles that form a functional system. Now, we can move 
directly to the analysis of the problem of the interrelation between brain function 
and structure in its narrow sense, i.e., to an analysis of the problem of brain func- 
tion localization taking into account how these functions are organized and 
formed. 
To understand better how the contemporary treatment of the structure of a 
function is reflected in the localization theory, one needs to remember a number 
of points, known in neurology since the times of Hughlings Jackson, but still not 
always taken into consideration as they deserve. 
Without doubt, the notion of a function "center" emerged on the basis of 
numerous clinical and experimental surgical brain studies, and carries a negative 
rather than a positive message, not implying a structure that realizes a function, 
but a structure whose destruction prevents the function from being realized, which 
4'The first two arguments in the present section concern the spatio-temporal patterns 
that are characteristic of function and the statistical nature of their elementary processes. 
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then leads to the corresponding syndrome of functional deficiency." The non- 
equivalence of such "positive" versus "negative" understanding was convincingly 
shown in a whole series of investigations, particularly those that compared the 
loss of activity induced by surgical interventions to the bioelectrical changes 
observed in different brain areas during unimpeded progression of corresponding 
brain processes. For example, such studies revealed that a crude destruction of a 
function can be induced by an injury to neural structures that play an important 
role in the conduction of impulses to the effector without being particularly sig- 
nificant for the preceding, most significant phases of function organization. 
In other studies, it was shown that a function may suffer under an action 
(surgical or electrical) in brain areas which most likely contain important path- 
ways of intracerebral impulse propagation (or, possibly, some other yet unknown 
tone generating brain structures), while the function is certainly realized by a 
much larger set of brain structures. Such situations were observed, in particular, 
by Penfield in his studies of the specificities of speech localization, and formed the 
foundation for the identification in the cortex of a whole system of so-called sec- 
ondary speech zones. 
All studies of this type thus demonstrated a much wider involvement of 
brain structures in the realization of a function than could be expected on the 
basis of the topography of the areas which can be used to destroy the function. 
Such an understanding has certainly not been unexpected. It was prepared by ear- 
lier experimental work, in particular studies of P.K. Anokhin (1958) which dem- 
onstrated unusually wide responses within the central nervous system, even to 
the lightest and most local stimuli. As shown by accurate experiments by Soviet 
and foreign scientists, responses to single stimuli applied to the skin or mucosa 
can be detected not only in different cortical areas but also in the trigeminal 
nucleus, the visual colliculus, Arnmon's horn, in the striatum, at different levels 
of the brainstem reticular formation, and even at the level of spinal structures. 
With respect to this problem of the wide distribution of responses to stimulation, 
Granit (cf. 1964) once said that if one had a sufficiently sensitive gauge, a 
response to a stimulus even when applied to a single receptor, or to activation of 
a single motor unit, could probably be detected in each of the hundreds of mil- 
lions of cells that compose the central nervous system. 
Polysensory Neurons 
The wide spread of reactions to stimulation never created the impression of a 
simple diffusion of excitation but, on the contrary, revealed a clear differentiation 
of the reactions of different neural structures and, therefore, a similar differenti- 
ation of the role of these structures in responses. For a while, this phenomenon 
helped to avoid seeing the contradiction with the traditional understanding of 
function localization. One was able to hypothesize that the wide distribution of 
reactions to stimuli of a certain modality was simply due to a considerably wider 
than expected representation of the "distributed elements" of the corresponding 
analyzer. Such a soothing interpretation, allowing to disregard the signs of the 
inevitably approaching necessity to radically reconsider the existing views, sur- 
--- --A 
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vived for a short time only. 
This conservative scheme was destroyed by blows from different direc- 
tions: Studies revealing the peculiar fact of the convergence of impulse volleys 
induced by stimuli of different modalities to the same neurons, the analysis of 
secondary or irradiating potentials, and finally, the ultimate proof of the exist- 
ence of neurons of the so-called polysensory type, not only in the reticular for- 
mation, as had been admitted earlier, but also in many cortical structures. 
Let us briefly review some of the conclusions from these new experimen- 
tal findings. 
About 10 years ago, researchers who investigated the spread of excitation in the 
brain stem reticular formation, discovered the phenomenon of impulse conver- 
gence induced by the stimulation of different central structures and receptors 
from different sensory modalities within the same areas of the brain stem. Such 
facts were described in 1952-1954 by Bremer and Terzuolo (1954), French, Van 
Amerongen, and Magoun (1952), French, Verzeano, and Magoun (1953), and 
many others. During stimulation of reticulopetal projections, with stimuli follow- 
ing each other at different intervals, one could observe different forms of mutual 
influence among the incoming excitations (facilitation, blocking, etc.) in the 
target areas of the impulses. Later microelectrode studies have shown that, in 
such cases, there is a genuine convergence of impulses of different modalities on 
single neurons of the reticular formation (Baumgarten, Mollica, & Moruzzi, 
1954; Rossi & Zanchetti, 1960; and others). 
At the same time, it was shown that the wide responsiveness of the retic- 
ular formation to stimuli of different modalities and intensities cannot be inter- 
preted as a simple diffusion of excitatory waves spreading indiscriminately 
over an unstructured functional substrate. The convergence of afferent 
impulses onto a single reticular formation cell turned out to be a common phe- 
nomenon, but not a universal rule. A study by Scheibel with coauthors 
(Scheibel et al., 1955), performed at a very high level, has shown different 
degrees of convergence of heterogenic afferent impulses in different reticular 
neurons. These authors found cells responding to a polarization of the cerebel- 
lum, to tactile stimuli, tendon taps in the extremities, and electrical stimulation 
of the sensorimotor cortex, but showing absolutely no response to vagus stim- 
ulation or to sounds. Similar phenomena of differential responsiveness of 
reticular neurons to stimuli of different types were revealed by many other 
authors. It is of interest to note that a large number (up to 50% in the pons and 
up to 65% in the midbrain) of "relatively mute" reticular cells were described, 
i.e., neurons whose electrical activity did not change during adequate sensory 
stimulation, cortico-reticular and cerebello-reticular impulse inflow, or even 
during strong electrical stimulation of afferent nerves (Mancia, Mechelse, & 
Mollica, 1957; and others). 
As a result of all these studies, two major points have been emphasized: 
First, the very peculiar character of the spread of heterosensory excitations in the 
reticular formation using, in appropriate conditions, the same conducting and 
processing neuronal structures; and, second, the selective responsiveness of dif- 
ferent reticular neurons to incoming excitations, reflecting their different roles in 
the processes of neural integration. Further, it has been shown that similar rela- 
tions of neurons to impulses of different modalities exist in other brain structures 
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(subcortical nuclei, limbic system, and neocortex). Therefore, they reflect a gen- 
eral principle of the organization of brain systems. Main studies leading to these 
more general interpretations are linked to the name of Fessard (1964).43 In recent 
years, they have exerted a deep influence on the science of localization. 
Electrophysiological studies have established that heterogenic signals of 
both sensory and central origin converge in the neocortex over rather large teni- 
tories. This important fact was established, in particular, in studies of so-called 
secondary or irradiating evoked potentials in response to the stimulation of a cer- 
tain modality, far beyond the corresponding projectional field. 
Buser and Irnbert (1964) have shown that neurons of the sensorimotor cortex in 
cats (under narcosis or without it), besides bioelectrical reactions to somesthetic 
stimuli, show regular responses to visual and auditory stimuli (during extracel- 
lular microelectrode recording). Neurons responding to all the used forms of 
stimulation (somatic, visual, and auditory) were considered as "polysensory." 
Neurons responding only to somatic stimuli, independently of the area of the 
body to which the stimuli were applied, were termed "polyvalent" or "atopic." 
Finally, neurons whose activation occurred only in response to somatic stimuli in 
strict relation to the classical principles of the organization of somatic conduc- 
tion pathways, were viewed as "spatially specific." A detailed study of the topog- 
raphy of these functionally heterogenic cells was undertaken. The analysis 
revealed that up to 92% (!) of the neurons within the anterior sigmoid and the 
rostra1 section of the posterior sigmoid convolution belonged to the polysensory 
type, 8% to the polyvalent type, and 0% to the spatially specific type (in other, 
more caudal areas, these relations were somewhat different). 
Many other researchers have indicated the wide spread of convergence ef- 
fects among heterosensory impulse inflows in cortical neurons (Amassian & 
Woller, 1962; Jasper, Ricci, & Dome, 1962; Li, 1962; and others). All these data 
lead to the hypothesis that the specific functional features of the sensorimotor 
43At he time, Alfred Fessard was the leading French neurophysiologist. He often 
met with Russians in international conferences. Unfortunately, we have been unable to 
retrieve the Russian text of the 1964 Moscow Symposium on "Connection Theory in 
Sensory Systems." Reading Fessard's work (e.g., Fessard, 1963, 1969, 1974; Fessard & 
Gastaut, 1958; Fessard & Szabo, 1974) immediately reveals that he was astonishingly 
modern and inspiring. He was early in rejecting strong localizationism without jumping 
to general equipotentiality. His network theory of the organization of the brain was sto- 
chastic, emphasizing metastability. Of the concepts presented so far in the present 
paper, the spatio-temporal distribution of impulses may derive from Fessard. In the 
present section, he is mentioned for his understanding of polysensority. In the next sec- 
tion, the notion of "operator" will be introduced. This notion derives directly from Fes- 
sard. At the time of the present paper, French science was to be reorganized, no longer 
centered around relatively independent laboratories with their own continuity (plus a 
rather high degree of interaction with different groups). The system became much more 
focused on fashionable topics (such as, at the time, "motor program"). And relatively 
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cortex, as well as the specificities of the functioning of the reticular formation, 
are due to their neuropilee structure. 
We have discussed the problem of the polysensority of cortical and reticular neu- 
rons in detail because this problem is of particular significance for the present 
reconsideration of ideas on the principles of localization of brain function. 
Undoubtedly, our understanding of the regularities and, particularly, of the 
physiological significance of neuronal polysensority is very poor. For example, 
one study emphasized qualitative parallelism and synchronicity of the changes in 
potentials that were induced by two heterotopical somatic stimuli in a neuron of 
the medial thalarnic nucleus and in a cortical neuron. This allowed Fessard to 
suggest the existence of a special projectional connection between polysensory 
structures, whose mechanism, however, is still absolutely unclear. One could 
assume that convergence of different stimuli on one neuron could be particular- 
ly important for the associative process but it is certainly impossible to claim that 
this assumption is correct. Nevertheless, the proven fact of the existence of pol- 
ysensory neurons in different cortical and brain stem formations, allows for the 
introduction of important details with respect to the problem of the specificity of 
the localization of brain functions. 
Stochastically Organized Neuronal Nets 
The heterogeneous excitability of polysensory neurons in response to very dif- 
ferent stimuli, together with their wide representation within the central nervous 
system, certainly forces one to reject the idea that each of these neurons has a 
special system of links with all of the mind-boggling number of receptors that 
can potentially be connected to this neuron. It may be possible to prove mathe- 
matically that such a humongous, absurdly uneconomical communication sys- 
tem, consisting of numerous linear, functionally specialized neuronal tracts (i.e., 
nonintersecting pathways, each one dedicated to the transmission of excitations 
that are induced by stimuli of only particular modality), would have a volume far 
exceeding the limited volume of the skull and the spine. There is, however, only 
one alternative, that is a neuronal net scheme" involving a large enough number 
of relays of impulse volleys. 
Within such a net, heterogeneous impulses can spread at different times 
along both the same or different neural tracts (i.e., it eliminates, to a considerable 
degree, the functional specificity of conducting neuronal chains, a selective rela- 
tion of each of the neuronal tracts to impulses of a certain functional category, 
observed as the leading principle at more peripheral levels of the nervous 
system). As a result, within such a net, each impulse of excitation has numerous 
MFor the distinction between neuropile and connecting channels, see the paragraph 
that contains notes 22 and 23 in the first part of this paper (in vol. 3, issue 4 of Motor 
Control). 
451n 1986, Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) was proudly announced (Rum- 
melhart, McClelland, & the PDP Research Group, 1986; McClelland, Rummelhart, & the 
PDP Research Group, 1986). The present paper not only precedes that event by 20 years 
but is also much more biologically realistic than early forms of PDP. 
134 Latash, Latash, and Meijer 
potentially accessible tracts that lead in a required direction (consequently, there 
is an enormous increase in the reliability of the functioning of the whole mesh- 
like And finally, it is important that the design of the neuronal net 
depends not only on genetically predetermined specific factors but also on fac- 
tors of a "random" origin (i.e., details, whose design is determined by unfore- 
seeable environmental factors acting during embryogenesis; as a result, the 
design has the appearance of "random" growth and distribution of neuronal 
branches and synapses).?' 
This last specific aspect of the design of neuronal nets represents a partic- 
ular case of a more general, uniquely biological regularity, exemplified, as 
already been mentioned in our literature (Bernstein, 1963), by the extreme 
"resistance" of the organism with respect to basic, "essential" features of its 
design, and, vice versa, its extreme "compliance" with respect to "non-essential" 
features which, as a result, are very individual and show high va~-iability.48 In the 
case of a neuronal net, this combination of genetically fixed and "random" fea- 
tures has a very special physiological meaning. 
Because such a net has numerous possible ways of transmitting impulse vol- 
leys, and a huge number of neuronal contacts and branches, special, statistical reg- 
ularities of the distribution of possible patterns of excitation spread emerge. These 
regularities spontaneously, if such a metaphor is possible, assure the existence of 
certain types of neuronal interaction which are important for communication, 
inevitably following the laws of the theory of large numbers and probability theory. 
That is why the inevitable "chance" element in the structure of dendrites and axons 
cannot become an obstacle for the normal functioning of a stochastically organized 
neuronal net. On the other hand, within a linear, rigidly fixed system, consisting of 
functionally specific connections with no statistical determination, a minor element 
of randomness in the distribution of branches and contacts is doomed to become a 
menacing source of unavoidable functional disorders.49 
The Ambiguous Relation Between Structure and Function 
The above ideas on the specificities of excitation neurodynarnics within a neu- 
ronal net have penetrated deeply into contemporary neurophysiology. They force 
This  may be viewed as another example of the shift from the notion of "redundan- 
cy" as a nuisance feature that needs to be eliminated by the central nervous system to the 
notion of "abundance" as a useful factor increasing the system's reliability and flexibility 
(cf. Kugler, 1986). 
47Compare with Edelman, 1987. Moreover, such nets are robust against minor 
structural damage and may allow for quick and efficient relearning after major damage 
(Hinton & Sejnowski, 1986), while the general pattern of activity may even be robust 
against changes in grammar (Kauffman, 1993). 
48[Note in the original paper:] An example of this universal regularity is the fact that 
any two leaves on the stem of a plant are always similar to each other with respect to cer- 
tain basic, species specific features, while they never form perfect structural copies of 
each other. (Mathematically speaking, they are not mutually congruent). 
49This is the first place in the paper where a logically compelling argument is 
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We have already noted that one weakness of the system concept consisted in its 
easy acceptance of the idea of the rigid localization of the components53 of a 
function, whereas the idea of rigid localization of the function as a whole was 
rejected. Are we making a similar mistake by rejecting the idea of rigid localiza- 
tion of a function while accepting rigid localization of specific features of neu- 
rodynamics defined by operators? It would be so, if the notion of operator were 
equivalent to the notion of function "component." However, this is not so, in par- 
ticular because the functioning of an operator is not linked to any single function 
and can be involved in the realization of very different brain functions. There- 
fore, there is no logical contradiction in accepting the idea of rigid localization 
of operators and rejecting a similar type of localization of functions. 
This conceptual system requires a clarification of such traditionally used 
notions as "a center" and "function being localized." An image of a rigidly 
defined "center" of a function identified on the brain map may certainly remains 
useful in studies of clinical syndromes, i.e., in the localization of zones whose 
injury leads to a disorder of function. However, such an image loses its signifi- 
cance if one tries to identify the totality of mechanisms forming the foundation 
of such a function. Moreover, relating the notions of "function" and "localiza- 
tion" meets with difficulties even in the area of semantics. It is sufficient to con- 
sider the problem of identifying "function localization" in any mechanism (for 
example, that of a watch) to appreciate these difficulties." To illumine the emerg- 
ing inconsistencies, one needs to involve an area of mathematics that deals with 
the problems of notion incompatibility and logical paradoxes. However, we are 
not going to venture into this area now. 
Thus, we are arriving at the general conclusion that only data on patterns 
of changes, proceeding differentially in different brain structures, and reflecting 
the role of these structures as operators in the processes of information transfor- 
mation, can form a concrete foundation for an understanding of the localization 
of any brain function. Hence, the main task of the localization doctrine is to 
define the character of these patterns for each individual brain function, their sig- 
nificance for the time development of the functions, and their dependence on the 
external conditions of its development. There absolutely cannot be any other 
meaning of the notion of a brain substrate for a f~nction.'~ 
Such are the answers contemporary knowledge provides to questions re- 
garding the relation between the structure and the functional activity of the brain. 
In many aspects, these answers differ from traditional views, but this should not 
be a major source of concern to us since many factors suggest that the differences 
are well based and represent signs of progress. 
53Since function is externally defined (cf. note 39), these "components" are what 
can be seen from the outside. The authors argue that the underlying structures do not map 
one-to-one onto externally defined components 
54Again, these difficulties appear if one attempts to subdivide an externally defined 
function and then proceeds to map the subdivision onto the internal structure of the watch. 
55This is the second climax of the paper. The powerful statement in the last phrase 
remains challenging with respect to recent studies using contemporary techniques in at- 
tempts to localize a whole variety of functions ranging from movement to memory to 
speech and so on. 
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Forthcoming Biological Chapters of Mathematicp6 
In conclusion, let us say a few words regarding the possible help that can be expected 
from mathematics in solving crucial contemporary problems of brain physiology. 
The current stage of development is characterized by an increasing com- 
plexity of the methods, and a striving towards a common languagen and a com- 
mon understanding among scientists working in different areas. In particular, this 
process is reflected in the increased attention of mathematicians to biological 
problems and their mathematical modeling. 
Mathematicians who are addressing biological problems took time to understand 
that their wonderful apparatus developed for the analysis of problems pertaining 
to inanimate nature, which worked impeccably for problems of physics and 
chemistry, is inadequates8 to address the new realm of questions which they tried 
to tackle with a degree of arrogance. 
Now, this initial phase of misunderstanding is over, and the best mathema- 
ticians have been able to appreciate that their arsenal is still unable to reflect ad- 
equately the specificity of biological processes. 
It has become obvious that the route to making biology "more mathematical" 
should not imply an application of mathematics to biology from outside but a de- 
velopment of new, "biological" chapters of mathematics that originate from 
inside, i.e., from the essence of the problems posed by the life sciences. Then, 
equipped by an adequate mathematical apparatus, biology and biocybernetics 
will probably merge into a synthetic discipline which will become their new, 
supreme stage.59 This emerging discipline looks particularly promising for con- 
cepts on brain structure and function. 
There are two major classes of mathematical relations that look particular- 
ly promising for modeling and analysis of brain functions: (a) the class of map- 
pings or and (b) the class of functions of dispersion. A third, similarly 
important class, embracing the functions of control and regulation in living organ- 
5This last section was written by Bernstein himself. It is clearly inspired by his co- 
operation with Gel'fand and Tsetlin. 
S7Although the development of a theoretical neurophysiology, and thus of a new 
"common language," is central to the paper, ascribing this search for a new, common lan- 
guage to neurophysiologists at large is overoptimistic. In a way, it still is-many still are 
convinced that it is too early to develop such a new language. Bernstein, however, knew 
there were several important seminars going on in Moscow-Gel'fand on a new mathe- 
matical language for biology, Gurfinkel on physiology, and Lyapounov on the mathemat- 
ical foundations of cybernetics. This certainly led to an atmosphere of optimism. 
was, and still is, an important point of Gel'fand (cf. Gel'fand & Latash, 
1998). One is reminded of: "Biologists understand the problem but lack the mathematical 
skills, and mathematicians have the skills but don't understand the problem" (Bernstein, 
196511988, p. 246, quoted from Bongaardt, 1996, p. 42). 
unified mathematical understanding, however (un)realistic, was Bemstein's 
dream in his last years (cf. Bongaardt, 1996, pp. 42-43). 
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isms, unlike the former two, has already been significantly developed in theories 
of automatic regulation, of the behavior of limit automata, of so-called "games 
with nature," etc. The former two classes have not been as lucky yet. As it is clear 
from the names of these classes, the first one-the class of mappings-is intimately 
tied to processes and results of active generalization, i.e., ultimately, to "essential" 
variables as they were described earlier. The second class-the class of dispersion 
functions-clearly includes problems of adaptive variability and the concrete real- 
ization of processes and actions, i.e., problems of "non-essential"  variable^.^' 
The class of mapping functions includes all types of functional mathematical re- 
lations, expressing projections of similarly organized sets of elements onto other 
sets of elements organized according to a different (even stochastic) principle. 
It is easy to imagine the breadth of the area occupied by functions of the 
mapping class within the field of biology; this area includes many vitally impor- 
tant relations between the organism and its environment. Information reception 
and processing by the organism, at all the stages of its progression-from the re- 
ceptor, through the afferent pathway with its relay nuclei, to the highest integrat- 
ing apparatuses of the brain-represents a whole chain of events which belong to 
this class. Every synthetic afferent process is mapped (certainly, far from unam- 
biguously) onto a responding motor action (in its wide meaning). Most impor- 
tantly, every generalized program6' of actions is founded on intrinsic processing 
in systems of mapping, so-called "models of the present and of the future."63 
A particular version of mapping relations can be found in the relation be- 
tween the program of a motor act (or of any other active process), formed as a 
"model of the future," and the actual execution of the act. The latter may be 
viewed as a particular reflection of the former, i.e., an active projection of a pro- 
grammed brain code onto reality with a corresponding time delay. To date, it is 
clear that mathematical categories adequate to the relations within this class are 
yet to be found; nevertheless, there are reasons to expect that the creation of these 
new mathematical tools will contribute to the development of perceptronics, 
whose problems until now have not found precise so l~ t ions .~~  
The profound specificity of the mapping class in biological objects becomes par- 
ticularly clear when contrasted by the class of dispersion functions. 
6'Studies of patterns of motor variability ("dispersion functions") have recently 
been used by several groups (Haggard, Hutchinson, & Stein, 1995; McIntyre, Stratta, & 
Laquaniti, 1997; Scholz & Schoner, 1999) to test hypotheses regarding different "essen- 
tial variables." 
62Nine years after the appearance of the present paper, the notion of a "generalized 
program" was reintroduced by R.A. Schmidt in one of the most frequently cited papers in 
the whole history of psychology (Schmidt, 1975). 
63Although this paragraph is very close in spirit to the notion of action-perception 
coupling originating from works by Gibson (e.g., 1979), contrary to Gibson (or Gestalt), 
the mapping is "far from unambiguous." 
64This is vintage Bernstein. The very fact that there is no solution yet allows him to 
speculate about the applications of the solution-to-come. To Bemstein, unsolved problems 
are so much more interesting than solved ones. 
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All human motor acts, in particular skilled repetitive motor acts such as 
locomotion, writing, simple labor movements, etc., have a characteristic variabil- 
ity of the kinematic patterns, or of the parameters of corresponding kinematic 
equations which describe the movements. Very rarely can one reveal an adaptive 
purpose of these variations among cycles of a movement (for example, due to the 
uneven surface of the road, wind blasts, resistance of a material or of an opponent, 
etc.). The considerable "residual" scatter across movement repetitions, observed 
under conditions of ideally reproducible external conditions, cannot be viewed as 
a result of the action of unobservable factors that escape the attention of the ex- 
perimenter. If we also take into consideration that variability, both adaptive and 
sto~hastic,6~ always applies only to non-essential components and parameters of 
the movement, and never affects its essential, goal-related characteristics, we nat- 
urally come to the conclusion that this group of phenomena reflects a particular 
subordinated structure of control, inherent to the motor apparatus. 
During the last years, the idea of such a subordination has been expressed in 
a mathematical model and has received experimental support in a series of studies 
by I.M. Gel'fand and his coauthors (Gel'fand & Tsetlin, 1962, 1966; Gel'fand, 
Gurfinkel, & Tsetlin, 1962) and by M.L. Tsetlin (1963). According to the model of 
these authors, the higher controlling brain apparatus does not send detailed com- 
mands along efferent pathways to lower (spinal) structures, that is to say, to mus- 
cles." Rather, it sends commands for the recruitment of working rnatrices,'j7 devel- 
oped earlier and localized, according to many findings, in the segmental apparatus 
of the spinal cord including alpha- and gamma-motoneurons, afferent neurons of 
different types and modalities, and the so-called intemeuronal medium. When re- 
cruited, each functional matrix possesses enough autonomy in assuring the execu- 
tion of corresponding elements of a motor act. Each matrix switches its compo- 
nents-either following commands from brain systems that detect errors, or, possibly 
when the situation becomes too complicated for a given matrix, bringing about some 
kind of SOS signal from the corresponding segmental system to higher brain organs. 
Presently, it is important to emphasize two aspects of the functioning of 
these subordinated systems. First, we are forced to assign to the lower matrix ap- 
paratuses not only the ability to accumulate experience, i.e., to form their own 
connections and develop their own "tactics" based on the experienced interaction 
with the environment, but also the active search for optimizing the "games with 
nature,"@ into which these apparatuses are involved. From this view, the afore- 
mentioned "residual" dispersion, which probably cannot be assigned a reactive- 
adaptive meaning, should be characterized as a search dispersion, i.e., as active 
forms of testing the situation, its gradients, optimal directions of actions, e t ~ . ~ ~  
65Earlier in the text (cf. note 7), adaptive variability was also regarded as stochastic. 
661t is interesting to note that Bernstein now ascribes his own 193511967 idea to 
Gel'fand and Tsetlin. 
67Compare with the subsection on Matrix Control in Part I (in vol. 3, issue 4 of 
Motor Control). 
"It was in particular Tsetlin who emphasized the importance of studying such "games." 
'j!'For Bernstein on search variability, see 196511988. The present argument is close 
, CO 
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Second, if indeed variability and dispersion emerge because of the func- 
tional properties of segmental matrices, playing an important role in the adapta- 
tion of essential action components to external conditions, qualitative mathemat- 
ical characteristics of observed dispersions should directly depend on the 
structure and pattern of the purposeful interrelationships between the two subor- 
dinatively linked levels. This means that, in each particular case, the function of 
dispersion is a reflection of these structures and patterns. If this idea is correct, 
processes of control of actions, that are difficult for both registration and direct 
mathematical interpretation, can find an interpretation in their reflections in func- 
tions of dispersion, in all their wide qualitative variety and specificity. It is less 
crucial which particular algorithms will link these functions to corresponding 
actual patterns and whether it will be possible to express these algorithms with 
presently available notions and symbols of mathematics. 
We are not going to try to further develop all these ideas (such attempts are 
presented in one of the last works by N.A. Bernstein). We would only like to state 
that we-biologists-are to address the problem of formulating requirements and 
axioms of the emerging field of biomathematics of tomorrow which promises to 
develop and spread widely. It is possible to solve this problem, however, only in 
a close symbiosis between biologists and mathematicians, a symbiosis not in the 
form of formal contacts, but in a true natural merging of their creative thinking. 
The perspectives of such a symbiosis are truly without limits.70 
Epilogue 
Lev I? Latash, Mark  L. Latash, and Onno G. Meger 
Are we closer now to the "biomathematics of tomorrow" than Bassin, 
Bernstein, and L.P. Latash were 30 years ago? Of course, this is in part a matter 
of opinion. Nevertheless, most researchers would probably agree that an ade- 
quate formal language for biological problems ("biomathematics") does not 
exist, yet, and that: all the attempts at importing a language from areas of physics 
and mathematics have failed to remedy the problem. In our opinion, this state- 
ment includes applications of the theory of dynamical systems, however fasci- 
nating, because these attempts fail, at least so far (e.g., Kelso, 1995), to connect 
with the specificity of the structures that underlie thefunctions. 
So, again we find ourselves emphasizing the need for a theoretical neuro- 
physiology-for the development of an adequate language to capture the prob- 
lems of motor control. In this respect, the late 60s were quite inspiring, both glo- 
bally and locally. 
'"This is the third and last climax of the chapter. The first (note 25) was that we have 
to define the notion of a "brain center" for a function, that is, that we have to understand 
"function" before we can understand localization. The second (note 55) stated that under- 
standing "function," and thus localization, implies characterizing the spatio-temporal pat- 
terns that pertain to a function. These two are now linked with Bernstein's (and Gel'- 
fand's) dream of a really new biomathematics. 
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we met in editing the present paper is that of Alfred Fessard who was the lead- 
ing neurophysiologist in France in the 1950s and wrote in 1958 (!) about stochas- 
tic neural networks with specific functional capacities (Fessard & Gastaut, 1958; 
cf. Burns, 1958). The present paper reveals how much of a source of inspiration 
Fessard really was. To date, his work is all but forgotten. 
There may be an important message in this aspect of the history of neuro- 
physiology. Many researchers may feel that even now it is too early to  create a 
"theoretical neurophysiology" because we don't sufficiently understand the 
basic facts. However true this may be, we argue that relevant discussions and 
attempts in the past may have received insufficient attention. So, by editing the 
present paper, we hope that we not only contribute to the historiography of our 
science, but also add relevant ideas to contemporary debates. 
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